Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 9

Issue 3

Article 11

1958

Corporations
Hugh Alan Ross

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Hugh Alan Ross, Corporations, 9 W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 284 (1958)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol9/iss3/11

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an
authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

Uune

fendant for transportation to New Orleans. The suitcase was not delivered to plaintiff upon her arrival, or thereafter. At the time of the
purchase of her -ticket and also when she checked the suitcase, plaintiff
declared no value upon it. Defendant made no extra charge based upon
value in excess of $100. No discussion was had -between the parties
pertaining -to-the value of ,the luggage or the insuring of it.
.. At -the time the above took place, defendant had on file with the
Civil Aeronautics Board a tariff, which tariff had been duly filed, posted
and published as required by the Civil Aeronautics Act. The tariff provided that .the total liability of the defendant occasioned by reason of any
loss in the delivery of personal property accepted for transportation
would be limited to $100 for each passenger unless excess value was
declared and an extra charge paid therefor. Plaintiff was unaware of
the published tariff and did 'not read the conditions in small print on her
ticket and baggage check referring to limited lia'bility. Held: The limitation of liability is valid; the passenger could recover no more than $100
for the 'baggage lost by the airline.
ROBERT C. BENSING

CORPORATIONS
. During the past year the Ohio courts have dealt with a wide variety
of interesting corporation problems, both of procedure' and of substance.2
Five of these cases are worth special comment, either as examples of the
application of familiar rules to unusual situations, or, as in the Drane
.case discussed at the end of this article, as cases which involve complex
or developing legal doctrines.

Security Regulation
The Ohio Securities Act, or "blue sky law," expressly provides that
'a pre-incorporation subscription is'a security subject to regulation, and
expressly excludes a real estate contract from the definition of security.
'Buza v. Kelley Island Co., 138 N.E. 2d 449 (Ohio Cr. App. 1956) (in action by
shareholder to assert the dissenting shareholder's remedies granted by OHIo REV.
CODE § 1701.85, plaintiff must sue in the county where corporation has its statutory
main office, not where the corporation has in fact its principal office).
'Spitz v. Volibar Realty Co., 138 N.E. 2d 438 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956) (purchase by
corporation of its own shares and debentures valid where no proof that purchase was
part of a fraudulent scheme to increase voting control of the management group).
Macy v. Ramey, 144 N.E. 2d 698 (Ohio C.P. 1957) (where promoter for corporaion makes a contract on behalf of corporation with a third party, third party can
by subsequently formed correvoke contract prior to incorporation -ratification
poration does not relate back to date of contract).
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In State v. Silverberg3 the Supreme Court was faced with a hybrid contract which contained both elements. The defendant entered into a number of contracts in which he conveyed undivided interests in an apartment building. In the same contract the vendor agreed to form a corporation capitalized at the total sale price of the building, and each vendee
agreed to convey his interest in the building to the corporation when
formed, in return for part of the shares of the corporation. The end
result would be a co-operative apartment house in corporate form, with
the tenants as shareholders. The defendant vendor was convicted of selling unregistered securities. The Supreme Court set aside the conviction,
pointing out that the intent of the Securities Act was to protect investors
in a profit making enterprise. Here the contract allowed each subscriber
to occupy a specific apartment unit and the overall effect of the arrangement was to provide the vendee with a place to live, rather than a profit.
Although the court did not mention it, similar cases from other states
have pointed out that if public regulation of this type of contract is desirable, it should be left to the real estate board, rather than to the securities department which is less familiar with the situation.
Corporate Entity
It is commonly stated that the corporate entity will not be disregarded
simply because all of the shares are owned by one man. Something
further is required, such as co-mingling of assets, failure to follow corporate formalities, undercapitalization, etc. It is well to remember that the
general rule just stated is often modified when the state is attempting to
disregard the corporate personality as an incident to the exercise of the
police power. The recent Khoury case is a good illustration of the ease
with which the courts look behind the corporation where public safety
is involved. 4 Khoury applied for renewal of a liquor license for a bar
owned by him as a sole proprietor. Over his objection, the board admitted evidence of liquor law violations at another bar, owned by a corporation, of which Khoury was the sole shareholder. The court held the evidence admissible and sustained the finding of the board that the application should be denied because of the applicanes past record as a
violator.
Ownership of Shares
In the Brownewell 5 case, the Supreme Court finally settled a problem
which has been the subject of dispute in the lower courts. The plaintiff,
166 Ohio St. 10, 139 N.E. 2d 342 (1956).
'Khoury v. Bd. of Liquor Control, 141 N.E. 2d 787 (Ohio C.P. 1957).
'Brownewell v. Columbus Clay Mfg. Co., 166 Ohio St. 324, 142 N.E. 2d 511
(1957).
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an Ohio resident, brought suit in an Ohio court in order to impress a
constructive trust on shares in an Ohio corporation. The certificates were
in the hands of an executor in California. Under the common law rule,
for purposes of in rem jurisdiction the share is an intangible located in
the state of incorporation, regardless of the location of the physical certificate. A number of Ohio cases decided prior to the adoption of the
Uniform Stock Transfer Act recognize this rule, and the U.S.T.A. does
not expressly change it. In the Silberman6 case, decided since the adoption of the Act, the court of appeals repeated the common law rule but
did not consider the effect of the Act on the problem. In the Brownewell
case the lower courts held that the overall effect of the Act was to make
the certificate negotiable, and thus the situs of the share was California.
The Supreme Court affirmed in an able opinion by Judge Bell, which
expressly repudiated the Silberman decision. Apparently, any action involving ownership of shares, whether legal or equitable, must now be
brought in the state in which the certificate is located unless it can be
shown that the certificate has been lost or destroyed, in which case the
Act provides that an action may be maintained in the state of incorpora7
tion.
In Ohio, as in most states with modern corporation codes, it is clear
that a director need not be a shareholder.8 Apparently, some corporations assume that the old rule is still in effect, and issue "qualifying
shares" to newly-elected directors who are not already shareholders. In
Central Oil Emulsion Corporation v. Roesch9 the corporation was allowed to recover the share after the shareholder ceased to be a director.
The court concluded that the share was issued solely because of a mistaken belief that it was necessary to qualify the recipient as a director,
and that the shareholder was not intended to become the beneficial
owner, in spite of the fact that the shareholder had been paid dividends
and allowed to vote his share.

Fundamental Corporate Changes
The Drane'° case raises one of the most difficult and confusing problems in Ohio corporation law; the power of a corporation to amend the
articles of incorporation in a manner prejudicial to a shareholder, without
'Silberman v. Silberman, 99 Ohio App. 340, 121 N.E. 2d 838 (1954).
OIO REv. CODE § 1705.20.
'OHIo REv. CODE § 1701.56 (c).
'139 N.E. 2d 88 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).
10
Drane v. Lawton Co., 141 N.E. 2d 259 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).
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his consent."1 The case is difficult to analyze because some of the important facts are not given in the opinion.
To oversimplify a complex problem, the articles of incorporation constitute a contract among the shareholders, and of course a normal contract
cannot be modified except by consent of all parties.' 2 Indeed, a statute
authorizing such a modification by less than all would be in violation of
the constitutional rule against impairment of contractual obligations, as
interpreted by the Dartmouth College case.' 3 To avoid the effect of the
Dartmouth College decision, the states incorporated "reserve clauses" in
both the constitutions and general corporation codes, reserving to the
state the right to amend corporate charters. A few courts have held that
thb reserve clause only permits changes by the state in the public interest, but the vast majority, including Ohio, hold that the power of the
state to amend may be delegated by statute to a majority of the shareholders. Thus it is held that where a statute authorizes a speclfic amendment by less than all of the shareholders, each shareholder takes his share
subject to the amendment power and assents in advance to the change.
In a number of states, including New York and Delaware, the reasoning
has been pushed one step further. The argument is that since there is a
general amendment statute, each shareholder takes his share in contemplation of the amendment statute as it is, or as it may become by legislative amendment. This doctrine has been expressly rejected in New Jersey and some other states, at least where the proposed amendment attempts to affect certain contract rights which are deemed more important than others, and are thus referred to as "vested rights." In states
which follow the New Jersey view, most of the cases involve attempts to
cancel accrued cumulative dividends, but other contract rights such as
voting, cumulative voting, pre-emptive rights and redemption have also
been treated as "vested" and beyond the power of alteration in the absence of a very express statute in effect when the corporation was
chartered.
The Ohio opinions prior to 1946 indicated that we had adopted the
majority or Delaware doctrine, and this same approach is clearly stated
2tp'sas 5g114uofqiS pur vTB71taqA1 ;q2 uI "apo)uopr1ocroa aqi u
' The best recent article on the problem in Ohio is Lattin, A Primeron Fundamental
Corporate Changes, 1 WEsT. Rs. L. REv. 3 (1949).
' The rule of no modification without unanimous consent was first applied to the
corporate charter by Natusch v. Irving, 47 Eng. Rep. 1196 (1824) which used the
analogy of the partnership agreement.
'Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
"LWheatley v. A.I. Root Co., 147 Ohio St. 127, 69 N.E. 2d 187 (1946).
" Schaffner v. Standard Boiler and Plate Iron Co., 150 Ohio St. 454, 83 N.E. 2d 192
(1948).
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Supreme Court held that accrued dividends, not yet declared, could not
be eradicated by amendment where the corporation was chartered prior
to 1939, the date of the adoption of a statute which expressly permitted
such amendment. At least as to this kind of amendment, the New Jersey
rule would apply.
The Drane case involves an amendment by vote of a majority of the
shareholders so as to change the existing common shares into preferred
stock and the preferred into common. The objection was raised by a
common shareholder who would lose part or all of his voting rights. The
plaintiff shareholder had purchased his shares prior to the enactment of
a statute expressly authorizing this change. The court of appeals allowed
the amendment, distinguishing the Wheatley and Schaffner cases by holding that the dividend rights in the latter cases were "vested" while the
voting rights of the plaintiff were not. The decision seems directly contrary to the reasoning employed in the two Supreme Court cases, and is a
good illustration of the illusory nature of the "vested right" doctrine as a
protection for shareholders. There are other and more adequate safeguards for the minority shareholder. The principal devices used to protect the shareholder against abuse of the amendment power are:
(1) The requirement of class voting.16
(2) The right of a dissenting shareholder to force the corporation
17
to buy out his interest.
(3) The fiduciary duty of the majority, as tested by an equitable
standard of fairness.
In the Drane case, the court did not discuss the problem of good
faith, and the facts as stated in the opinion are insufficient for a reader
to make any evaluation. On reading the Drane case I am again impressed
with the wisdom of a comment of Professor Norman Lattin of Ohio
State University Law School:
A frank recognition that preferences are contract rights and nothing
more, which the reserved power to alter or amend may by subsequent legislation seriously affect, would do much to clarify the law and, at the same
time, would release the court's energies for the important function of ascertaining whether the proposed amendment has that fairness which extraordinary power placed in a majority requires.
HUGH ALAN ROSS
1

OIo REv. CODE § 1701.71(B).

OHio REv. CODE § 1701.74. In the Drarne case the court also held that the plaintiff had no such remedy, as dissenting shareholder's rights are granted only to preferred shareholders.
" Lattin, A Primer on Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1 WEST. REs. L. REV. 3,
25 (1949).
"

